
BUENOS AIRES – At-Large Ad-Hoc New Meeting Strategy Working Party

Tuesday, June 23, 2015 – 13:00 to 14:00

ICANN – Buenos Aires, Argentina

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Good afternoon, everyone. This is a meeting of the At-Large Ad-Hoc Working Group on the transition of U.S. Government stewardship of the IANA function and, also, of the Accountability Working Group. So we're going to be discussing both the topics of CWG IANA and CCWG Accountability.

Starting with the IANA side of the matter, on the agenda, we actually should have, first, an update from the IANA Coordination Group, ICG. I don't see any of our two representatives from the ICG in the room. So what I would suggest is that we skip this, and if they do come, then we will be able to come back to them. But it's quite important for us to have a number of deliverables at the end of this meeting.

This meeting here is tabled for 90 minutes. We actually have a second session afterwards that is optional, if we don't manage to conclude all the work that we have to conclude in those 90 minutes. And it could take here until 8:00 PM.

So discussion of the CWG proposals, including the latest developments. I don't think we need to go back through all of the discussions that have happened this week. There were several presentations. There was a public session of the CWG IANA with Larry Strickling also addressing everyone.

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I suppose that most people who are sitting around the table, if not all people, were over the sessions. I think Jonathan Robinson said yesterday that he made the same presentation four, five, six times or so. We're going to dig straight into the discussion, which is to look at the actual ratification of the CWG IANA report or proposal.

In parallel, just so that you are aware, the GAC is working on this and is working towards a statement or communique on the proposal. The GNSO has put together a motion, and I think we do have a copy of the motion here with us, and we might need to look at this a little bit later when we start drafting text.

But in the meantime, what's, I think, important is for our community to look at our, I suppose you could call it the laundry list of the things that we're not 100% happy with and find out if we wish to have this added to our response, if we do or we do not proceed with ratification later on this week, and to perhaps try and see if we can put what we really feel strongly about and not go for absolutely every single part of the proposal that we're not entirely happy with.

As you know, this is all about consensus. And if we're going to be, effectively, rejecting consensus by saying we're not happy with every single point that we didn't get 100% on, that really doesn't show much understanding of what consensus is at that point.

So I think that's the aim, at the moment. Alan is going to sort of co-chair the meeting with me since he's also taking notes, and I'll be running the queue, as well, because we do have a lot of work to do here and we do want to be efficient.

Alan, any additional intro words?

ALAN GREENBERG:

No. Not really. The largest source of particular comments on the current CWG report have come from an AFRALO document, an AFRALO document, which, by the way, is not yet ratified. That will be tomorrow. So we're working from the initial notes that went there, the current draft of that. Tijani sent an e-mail to me with the bullets of the items. I have forwarded it to the ALAC, and it's being displayed right on that screen really soon. What I would like to do is quickly go through them and see if we can come to the consensus on which of these issues are things that we believe we need to note and which of them are things that we believe we do not need to note.

The one that we already discussed is a general statement saying that we believe that the complaint or an issue raised by the CSC, which would trigger a special IANA function review to happen, we believe should have been a more multi-stakeholder process.

We could also add at the end of a separation review team, I believe, or the IFRT that it, again, goes to the GNSO, ccNSO, and we can make a comment on that, on the multi-stakeholder thing. That was the general consensus. Tijani, before we go through them one-by-one, do you have any general comments?

TIJANI BEN JEMAA:

Yes, thank you, Alan. It is about your remark.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Excuse me just for interceding here. Housekeeping note, please say your name before you start working, and speak slowly, which is what I'm not doing at the moment. Tijani Ben Jemaa?

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Sorry. You said, Alan, that the statement of AFRALO is not yet ratified yet. That's right, but those comments come from our statement sent to the public comment regarding CWG. So it is already approved.

ALAN GREENBERG: Yes, indeed. But since then, there have been changes, so they may or may not apply if they were said in the previous version. Alright. I'd like to start going through them. Is there any way to blow that up a little bit so it's really readable? If not, then everyone should have their own copy in e-mail at this point. Pretty much everyone.

Alright. Thank you. That's perfect. Alright. The first one is a comment: "the inclusion of two PTI Board members to be populated by the Nominating Committee should strongly ensure geographic diversity without neglecting competence." I have no problem saying that it should be done with regard to geographic diversity.

If this is being done by the Nominating Committee or a comparable body, I don't think we need to lecture them too much on diversity. And I believe there was a general intent that we should look for technical competence, not necessarily business competence. So I have no

trouble putting something in. I think we may word it in a more generalized way so it doesn't sound like we're lecturing. But I have no problem with that one at all.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: We'll just open the floor to see if anybody is okay. Any committees on that? Sebastien Bachollet?

SEBASTIEN BACHOLLET: Thank you, Sebastien Bachollet. Just to be clear because we talk about Nominating Committee, it's the ICANN Nominating Committee – because there are a lot of Nominating Committees in that world – and what we are talking about. Because we imagine that you create a PTI Nominating Committee. It's better to say it.

ALAN GREENBERG: My recollection is the proposal says, I don't remember the exact words. It suggests the Nominating Committee might be the right one. It is not prescriptive that it has to, but the words that we've used continually are, "We don't want to reinvent a brand-new entity for these two positions." So chances are it will end up being the ICANN Nominating Committee.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Eduardo Diaz.

EDUARDO DIAZ: Yes, I just wanted to mention, also, that in the Nominating Committee, we have five reps. So if this goes to be a Nomination Committee, we have to make sure there is a geographical diversity right there. What I'm saying with this is that even if we don't say this, it will happen.

ALAN GREENBERG: But I have no problem with noting it.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks. I don't anyone else in the queue. Back to you, Alan.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you. Second item. "The sustainability of PTI remains a serious concern, especially because it will rely on ICANN in terms of its resources, particularly funding, that needs to be carefully considered during implementation." I believe there are some very strong statements in the proposal regarding funding. They were not quite there in the original document, but I'm not sure that we need to mention that again.

Clearly, in the implementation, the funding of PTI because it also says there should be held in escrow a year's funding and a second year held by ICANN. So I don't feel we need to reiterate that.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Seun.

SEUN OJEDEJI: Yeah. Okay. Thank you, Alan. I just want to clarify, Alan. When you say “original document,” what are you referring to?

ALAN GREENBERG: Tijani had said that many of these things were already formally approved by AFRALO in the comments to the CWG. But when the report was finalized, there were very significant changes made between the version that was commented on and the version that we’re now looking at.

SEUN OJEDEJI: What I’m asking is that this was already reflected in the original document. Are you referring to this current CWG proposal?

ALAN GREENBERG: What I’m saying is the comments that were made, including the AFRALO comment, were among those things that were considered in the final revision, I believe, of the document. They may have been ignored, but they were all considered as comments.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you. It’s very difficult to see people put their hands up. I would ask if they can use their cards. But now I don’t know whether the next person was Vanda or Eduardo. So let’s have Vanda Scartezini.

VANDA SCARTEZINI: Just to make it more clear, you are saying that many questions, relevant points, are in the previous documents. My question is, what is the final document? They will get all those information together or in the end of the process, just open like that is the final one? Because many points must be more clear to be understood for implementation process. And in the beginning of the discussion, most of those issues were there.

But when we are progressing and trying to reach consensus and finalize, a lot of it was put aside. So that's my point. I don't know if we're going to have a document that really point out all the points that really matter.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Go ahead, Alan.

ALAN GREENBERG: At this point, there is a final CWG proposal. It is not subject to change today. Any comments we make along with ratification will be forwarded to the ICG and the ICG may choose to take them into account or not.

Should the report, the final proposal be rejected by sufficient ACs and SOs that it goes back to the CWG that we miss the deadline for submitting, then, of course, our comments might be considered at that iteration. But I am presuming, at this point, that it will be ratified across the board and, therefore, our comments may be considered in

the future. For implementation, they may be considered, but they would not alter the report at this point.

Just for the record, I'm happy to include a statement about financial viability. I think it's redundant but if the group feels strongly about it, I have no real problem with it. I would really like to keep to a minimum the number of things on our list, but I'm willing to listen to the group. I think Tijani is next.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks, Alan. Vanda, did you want to follow up?

VANDA SCARTEZINI: Just that we would [inaudible] that financial issues should be one of the points that we already discussed with the Board that we should get some part of that money to support these kind of solutions.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay. Thank you. I've got Tijani and Eduardo. Again, I didn't know quite know who was the first person who put his hand up. Eduardo is first? Eduardo Diaz, you have the floor.

EDUARDO DIAZ: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just want to also add to what Alan said about the financial. I don't think that we should put the comments there that are already taken care of. There was a lot of discussion, and I just want to add that on the accountability side, there is this issue about the

community being able to veto budgets. And that was there just to happen that if something happened with IANA on the budget side, there is a way the community can come back and change that. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Alan? Well, I always give the floor to Alan in case he wants to respond or anything.

ALAN GREENBERG: No, no.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Tijani Ben Jemaa?

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Thank you very much. Alan, if you are sure that this issue of funding of PTI is already in the new version. Because when I read the new version, I don't remember now that there is something like this. But if it is there, we don't have to put it. But if it is not there, I think that it is something important to put. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: As I said, I have no real problem with it. If there's going to be a problem, it's going to be four years from now and what's in our report doesn't matter a lot. But I have no problem putting a caveat in.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thank you. Right. No more hands up. So I believe we can move on to the next one. What have we decided on this? Just to summarize, Alan.

ALAN GREENBERG: We will put a reference in to ensuring good funding.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thank you. Let's go to the next one.

ALAN GREENBERG: Next item. "The prerogatives of the CSC should be strictly defined within its intent of monitoring the operational performance of IANA functions related to names and reporting." I'm not quite sure that reads but "its reports should be transparently available to the community."

My belief is that the delineation of what they can do is very narrowly defined in the report. We will likely have a liaison on the group, and I believe they said everything will be completely open. So I'm not sure that we need to hit that one again.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Any comments? Tijani Ben Jemaa?

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Alan, is it written in the proposal? This is important. Because what we are doing now is we are trying to put everything clear. If it is already put in the text, no problem. If it is not, I think it is a good thing to mention it.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay. I'll take it on as a task that I will look at the text in the proposal. If I feel comfortable, I will say so, and I will forward the text to the mailing list to confirm what I'm thinking. There was an awful lot of discussion on this, and I can't believe it isn't clear, but I will do another pass.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Alan. Any other comments or points in this? I don't see anyone putting their hand up. I think we can move to the next one. Just let's easily summarize what we're doing with this.

ALAN GREENBERG: The summary is I will look at the details of the wording of the proposal and make sure that at least I am comfortable that it is in sufficient detail. I will forward it to the group and we will have an opportunity, if necessary, if everyone disagrees with me, then, we can add a line covering it.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks, Alan. Next one.

ALAN GREENBERG: “There is no need to include a CSC liaison in the composition of the IFRT.” I guess my question would be (I don’t even remember that there is one, but I believe you that there is) does it hurt? My feeling is, remember, we are saying the review teams, if I remember correctly, we said they will be composed like the CWG and CCWG. That is, there will be members, and other people can come, also, and their views will be considered.

So I don’t really see whether it matters that there’s a liaison, which is presumably a nonvoting, there. I don’t see how it hurts. Because they can send the same person anyway.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Alan. My recollection on the inclusion of a CSC liaison was that because this is an escalation process, it would be helpful for the people on the IFRT to actually hear from someone on the CSC as to why the whole process was triggered. Seun Ojedeji, you have the floor.

SEUN OJEDEJI: Yeah. Thank you, Olivier. I think I should be specific that I was one of the people that actually suggested that particular edit. One of my reasons was because I consider IFRT to be an independent MS, that is, actually reviewing the activities of CSC [inaudible]. Because activity of CSC understands that it is what CSC says that PTI is doing or IANA [inaudible] is doing. That it’s based on that that it actually make their decisions.

So if they need to invite them, they can invite them to give reports or give updates. I don't see, actually, why they need to be a liaison. But based on what Alan has just said on [inaudible], maybe it doesn't. But I just don't think that is appropriate to have them on the list.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Alan?

ALAN GREENBERG: Just to comment, first of all, there's nothing to stop the registries or the ccNSO from appointing members of the CSC to the IFRT. So they certainly could do that. And by calling it a liaison, which they have, that means the person is not actually participating in the decision but is there as someone who can inform the group. So I personally feel very comfortable.

SEUN OJEDEJI: Okay. Thank you very much, Alan. I'd just like to get a clarification on what you just said, although it does not have to do with CSC. I think what you just said about there's nothing wrong in GNSO appointing members of CSC to IFRT. I think there's something wrong in that.

ALAN GREENBERG: I believe there is no proscription (not forbidden) in the composition of the IFRT that the registries or the ccNSO, who will appoint members to the group. I don't think there's any rule that they can't appoint the same person who sits on the CSC.

SEUN OJEDEJI: Yeah. So I think that we should take that as a point to note.

ALAN GREENBERG: I would just object strongly. I would think that, perhaps, the person...

SEUN OJEDEJI: For the same reason why we're actually separating the members of this SCWG from the IFRT. I think we should also separate the members from the CSC from the IFRT, as well. Because these are independent, we need some independence of the IFRT from all these other bodies, especially CSC. CSC is going to be a [inaudible]. It's entirely dominated with one side of the community.

And I think that it doesn't help to have the same person who actually has escalated up to a particular level to still be the same person who actually will be within the IFRT making decisions, unless you're saying that they are there as liaisons. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks, Seun. Next is Tijani Ben Jemaa.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Thank you, Olivier. I tell you the truth, the general feeling in our group is that there is a big domination of the registry in the PTI in general, and in the process. And we are thinking that in the IFRT there are

members from all the constituencies, from the GNSO, so they will be registries.

If you add another one from the CSC, which is a registry, too, we feel it is too much. That's why this point had been raised. So our point of view is that don't make it exaggerated.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Tijani. I see there are two points here that are being made. One about members of the CSC not being able to be members of the IFRT and a second one being about if one has a liaison that would actually up the numbers of the people on the IFRT. Do you want to respond or shall we still have Eduardo?

ALAN GREENBERG: May I, yes, specifically?

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. So Alan Greenberg?

ALAN GREENBERG: Number one. The liaison from the CSC is not necessarily a registry. There's other people on the CSC. That's number one. Number two, the concept of a CSC member cannot be a member – and remember, we also have liaisons and observers and whatever – a CSC member cannot be a member of the IFRT, this was never raised during the initial discussions. I would consider it highly improper for us to raise it

now as something that was never raised before. So I would strongly object to interjecting that at this point.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks, Alan. Eduardo Diaz. No? It's getting very hot, isn't it?

EDUARDO DIAZ: It's just that things are being said. Well, if, like Alan says, if the GNSO decided to put a CSC person in the IFRT, is their prerogative. And we didn't discuss this, like you said. We didn't bring this up because we were looking more on the multi-stakeholder picture.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thank you. So we still have the question with regards to the CSC liaison.

ALAN GREENBERG: I'm going to suggest that we put this in brackets. Brackets means the ALAC will decide, prior to issuing the report, whether we include it or not.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Let's put it in square brackets.

ALAN GREENBERG: That's what I meant.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Let's go to the next one. I can read through this one: "The activity of the IFRT should be transparently carried out and community-driven." Who wishes to speak to this? Alan?

ALAN GREENBERG: Is there any indication whatsoever that it's anything other than that? It is community-driven. The composition is specified at this point, including representatives from ACs and SOs. Like any review team, its documents are public and its meetings will be public. I don't see any indication that it's anything other than that already.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Eduardo Diaz?

EDUARDO DIAZ: It's just I'm not sure what IRFT means. Is it the same as IFRT or?

ALAN GREENBERG: IANA Functions Review Team.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: It's an anagram here.

EDUARDO DIAZ: It's the same thing?

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Yeah. Typo.

EDUARDO DIAZ: Oh, okay. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Indeed, and I guess these comments were made before the last-last version, so now we've got a lot more clarity on this. So this one we can keep out. The next one, the final decision on the action to be undertaken will not be the IFRT one since it would still be subject to GNSO and ccNSO approval.

So the multi-stakeholder nature is only any intermediate phase that can overridden by the registries. Floor is open. Alan Greenberg?

ALAN GREENBERG: Well, as I've already said, I think we are going to have a general statement other than what was here about the lack of multi-stakeholderism at various intersections. However, that being said, I recall that our position is there is no need for separation at all. So if there is no need for separation at all, we shouldn't be particularly complaining that there are extra steps which can stop it.

As far as I'm concerned, there should be a step there that says, "We always stop it." Because if you listened to the discussion yesterday in the Engagement Session with the RIRs, the whole concept of the separation being documented is problematic to begin with. And just like the IETF and the RIR and the CRISP report, I think we should have

been silent on the process. We weren't, but I have no problem with extra steps that may stop it from happening.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks, Alan. Seun Ojedeji?

SEUN OJEDEJI: Thank you, Alan. What is [inaudible] particular text is actually a situation whereby IFRT determines that there is no need for an SCWG. That is, there's no need for a separation. That goes to GNSO, and then it gets [stopped] there because GNSO has actually recommend escalated to IFRT hoping that there will be a separation.

So my point is, yeah.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Alan?

ALAN GREENBERG: You're saying if the IFRT recommends no separation, that everything is okay and we fix the problems, you think a negative vote from the GNSO and the ccNSO can reverse that. If indeed that's what it says, and we need to verify that, then I would suggest that is a reasonable thing to say, but I think that would be because of bad phrasing. I don't believe it's a statement that says the ccNSO and the GNSO can cause a separation review over the recommendations of the IFRT. I will review that and look at it.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Yeah, thank you, Alan. And thank you, Seun. That's a very valid point, indeed. So for this one, Heidi, Alan will look at that. Next one, the composition of the Separation Cross-Community Working Group, SCWG, should be made up of people different from IFRT members. We've already spoken about the difference between CSC and IFRT, now here it's a Separation Working Group and IFRT members.

The floor is open. Alan Greenberg?

ALAN GREENBERG: I'll make...

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Okay. Go for it.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Oh. You guys are being too nice to each other. So Alan?

ALAN GREENBERG: I do not think it's appropriate for us to identify something at this point which we never mentioned before. I'm also not sure there's a huge harm in it happening. If they have the expert on the problem, it's not clear that the expert shouldn't be on the next group, also.

But, again, raising something at this point which we've never raised before, I just have a philosophical problem with doing that. I'd like to

hear from... By the way, I'm not even a member of this group. Seun is. I wouldn't mind hearing from some of the other people who are at least participants, if not members, of the CWG, since they're the ones formally representing the ALAC on this group.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks, Alan. We have Seun and then Tijani. So Seun Ojedeji?

SEUN OJEDEJI: Thank you, Olivier. I think we need to clarify something. Yeah, we have been working on the CWG proposal for eight months now, perhaps, if I'm correct. It doesn't mean that we've achieved 100% accuracy in what we're doing. We may not have been able to have imagined this particular point, and if we discover it's now, if we think it's valid, I think it will make a lot of sense to include it.

I'm not saying that I don't see the reason why we say because we have not said it before, because we have not discovered it before, then we should not mention it. If we think it's an issue or if we think it's a valid point, I don't see any reason why we should not put it in there.

However, I'd like to go to the point on the reason why that statement was there. It's actually to indicate the fact that to avoid "capture" in the sense of the same individual, going through the process, okay. So we said one of the reasons why there was the SCWG was actually to ensure that the same thing that actually decided on the need for SCWG is not the same thing that goes through this separation process.

That was SCWG was suggested. I don't know if Avri was here; maybe she could say more about that.

It seems to be inaccurate or it seems to be unfair to still say an individual who is actually in IFRT should still be represented or be a member of SCWG. I don't think it's in the interest of the essence of the separation in the first place. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Seun. Tijani, was your hand up to speak to exactly the same point as Seun?

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Yes.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. So we'll respect the queue, then. I've got Tijani, Alan, and Cheryl. Tijani Ben Jemaa?

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Thank you, Olivier. I think it's obvious; the good thing to mention this is obvious. Because the [IRFT] will say, A, we have to do the separation. And then we will go through the Separation Working Group. So if they are the same people, why we go to this group? I think it is a separation of powers, we have to make as if you have the executive and the [legislative] you have to separate them. It is the same for me.

There is no interest to have the same people who are under [IRFT] to go on the Separation Working Group. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks, Tijani. Alan Greenberg next.

ALAN GREENBERG: I think we have, either you're confused or I'm confused, and Cheryl, of course, knows the reality. So she'll pass judgment in a moment. My understanding is the SCWG is not a second kick at the can of whether to separate. The SCWG is responsible for the process of separations in RFTs. So it is not an executive making the same decision over again. It is the group that is going to effect the separation, which was recommended by the IFRT. So it is really not a second kick at the can.

And so the whole issue of executive and management or whatever, I don't think, applies here at all. But the rest I've said. If we haven't mentioned to now, the comment was submitted to the process, it was reviewed by the design team that did this work. The design team certainly, the design teams that I worked on, debated those comments really well. I wasn't part of this particular one, so I can't talk about exactly what it is, and to simply reiterate it now because the design team didn't agree with us, I don't think that's quite proper, but Cheryl.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Alan. Cheryl Langdon-Orr?

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Actually, I think Seun has a right of reply – he waved – specific to something you said.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Seun Ojedeji?

SEUN OJEDEJI: Thank you very much, Cheryl, and thank you, Olivier. Alan, I think we need to clarify something. I'm not sure. I never said that SCWG was going to be the next deciding body. I said the essence, and I was also looking in the room to see if Avri was around, of SCWG is to start this separation process once IFRT has decided that there was going to be a separation. That was what I said.

Within the CWG, it was recommended that the same composition of IFRT should also be the same composition of SCWG. What I'm saying is, is it good, is it right to have the same person, the same individual, who actually decided? Because we have to be realistic here. It is very important to ensure diversity of views, right? It's very important to ensure that the way a particular individual follows all the view of its community is going to be different from the another person will follow it up.

So I think is it fair to have the same person who decide that there was a need for SCWG to also be the person that continues the process of separation. Again, I find it difficult. Yes, I understand that we should

have raised this earlier, and I apologize for that. I'm sure you know how voluminous and challenging the different discussions on CWG can be. So if I've missed that, fine. But if we have also seen that and identified that now, I don't see the reason why we shouldn't make it noted. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Seun. Actually, I think I need to jump in into this. Currently, with the CWG IANA, with the ICG, with the CCWG Accountability, we are in a position, we have the same people on these different working groups. So be careful what you wish for. If we do not have enough people to put on the IFRT and on the Separation Cross-Community Working Group on the day when that happens, we will probably be bitten by our own rule.

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Go on, Alan.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Just a quick one from Alan.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay. First of all, Seun, I was responding to Tijani when I was talking about two levels of question, not you. And I agree with Olivier. The functions of the two groups are completely different. One is making a judgment call; the other is looking at a process. It may well be that the person that we put on the IFRT to help make the decision is exactly the

person that we want to help guide the process. So I'm only one vote of 15 on the ALAC, but I would strongly object to saying this.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay, Alan. Thank you. Now, we've got a queue, still, with Cheryl Langdon-Orr and then Fatima Cambronero. So Cheryl, you have the floor.

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Thank you very much. Right. Let me see where to begin with this. First of all, in terms of some of what's been said since I put my hand up, I hope it is clear to those of you who are discomforted with this, that this is not a reconsideration process or a mechanism by which the decision can be reviewed or, in any way, shape, or form, altered.

Therefore, I would postulate to you that I could make a damnedably good argument that to have someone who has served on the original, maybe from an implementation point of view, an absolutely ideal person to have go through and ensure that the thoughts, desires, and rationale behind the decision-making process were well understood, the Is were dotted and the Ts were crossed, in that implementation.

I could make that. I'm not going to make that debate, but just remember, I think we could make that just as strong an argument as the counterpoint. Don't put your card up because this is the next thing I'm going to say.

As someone who has chaired a number of these rodeos, let me remind you all – not just the one group from one region I’m talking to – this is not actually fair when we’re trying to put some of these things to bed to belay the points. Present points, absolutely. Discuss one or two rounds, certainly. But I didn’t come here for a debate. I came here for decision-making and consensus-building.

And you know what? Everyone doesn’t have to get happy in a consensus outcome. The majority has to get as happy as they can get or as equally unhappy as they can get for a consensus outcome. And that’s we’re driving for today.

So I’m suggesting, respectfully, to the chairs that we draw a line under any such debate that goes on too long, and you’ve got members here, we can put our hands up, and we’ll let democracy decide.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Cheryl. We’ll move on to Fatima Cambronero.

FATIMA CAMBRONERO: Thanks, Olivier. I will be speaking in Spanish because we have excellent interpreters.

Actually, when I raised my hand, I had an idea in mind to speak about. And in the dynamics of the debate, my opinion changed. However, I’d like to state a couple of points. On the one hand, in formal terms, I think that if we have now discovered something that we hadn’t seen

before, I will agree with Seun. I think we can express it now, even though we have not seen it or said it before.

On the other hand, in this statement in particular, I could live with this statement as it is. I do understand the risk Olivier refers to. There may be not enough people to send to both groups different persons, but based on the legal principle for those of us who are lawyers that says what is not forbidden is permitted, we'd rather keep it in writing if we agree with it. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much for, this, Fatima. I think that the point I was trying to make was that it's not only a case of not having enough people, but we've also decided in the current arrangements that we would have the same people in the different component parts of the working groups because it's actually the same people that are following this whole thing.

In fact, I think that all of us on the IANA and Accountability Working Group are following both tracks, not just one track. So as Alan mentioned earlier, the idea of policy implementation, often, it's good to actually have somebody in the implementation team that was involved with drafting the policy. Because here, the SCWG does not have the ability to turn around and say, "Actually, we're not going to separate."

The decision made to separate is done by the IFRT. The SCWG is the group that is tasked to perform the separation and, therefore, to draft

the RFPs, etc. So Seun, I come back to you since you're the person that brought this forward, and be interested in hearing your point of view.

SEUN OJEDEJI:

Thank you, Oliver, and thank you, Cheryl. I'd just like to clarify that I am also not in the mood. In fact, I'm one of the people that would have loved that we finish this process a long time ago. I'm not in the mood of, also, necessarily stretching this beyond. But I just felt that it is important that if something is discovered and we think that it needs to be – just, perhaps, a question to some of my colleagues who are actually in the CWG Working Group. Why did we actually create the SCWG? What was the purpose?

Because, initially, we have said IFRT was going to not just decide that there was [need for separation]. I mean, at first, we are going with IFRT going through the process. And then we got to a point, we decided to break it down to IFRT just decide that there was going to be need for separation and then SCWG starting the process of the separation.

So why did we actually do it that way? Because right now in the composition for IFRT and SCWG, it's the same thing from within all the SOs. I stand to be corrected. The composition recommended for IFRT and SCWG is the same thing, unless something has just changed recently. I stand to be corrected.

So why did we actually go decide that there was going to be a need for SCWG in the first place? Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Seun. My personal understanding is that it was to give the option for the different groups to choose whether they wanted to have the same person or a different person based on the task to be performed. And it might be that in some cases, some groups might think, well, it's better to have someone with specific skills on the SCWG that are not needed on the IFRT and specific skills on the IFRT that are not needed on the SCWG.

There are other groups that might have people that have the skills for both of the groups and might, therefore, wish to put the same person both on the IFRT and the SCWG. That's my understanding. Of course, the floor is open for everyone else to comment. Alan Greenberg?

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you. We made literally hundreds of decisions within this group. Many of them were delegated to design teams to talk about these things in great depth without boring the rest of us to tears while it was being done, coming back with a recommendation, and the whole CWG had an opportunity to comment on whether they thought this made sense or not.

I know, certainly, on the design team that I ran, there were lots and lots of things that we considered and rejected, not necessarily because they were horrible but we had to pick and we made a choice. And I think the design team that did this made a choice. I personally think it's a reasonable choice. I just don't think we want to be in the business of questioning the various choices that were made along the way that we didn't question earlier.

That would reopen the whole thing. It's just so many, literally, there were thousands of decisions made along the way.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Alan. I've got Cheryl Langdon-Orr and then Eduardo Diaz.

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Thank you. One of the things, I think, that we could also be getting at in this part of our discussion is the necessity for a two-step process rather than a one thing, agree, separability, yay or nay. And if it's separability, then recommend to the Board and somehow the magic happens.

Why I am a supporter of the two-step process is it forces transparency. Because it has to go to the two support organizations. It will be exposed to the full council and, therefore, the full plethora of the GNSO membership and the ccNSO membership, and by default, the rest of ICANN, one would assume.

So in the horrifying possibility that we're asleep at the wheel at the time this decision was made, this is a matter of belts and braces for me. And so beyond just composition areas, from a structural point of view, I am actually very comforted by this. It takes a little bit longer but it forces, when you've got to reconstitute a second group, for a great deal more attention to be bought and we, hopefully, will never be asleep at the wheel when it happens. That's just a bit of personal thinking, it's not something that was discussed, and I wasn't part of the design team that did this.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Cheryl. Next is Eduardo Diaz.

EDUARDO DIAZ: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I recommend the Chair to rack this and put it on the table to the side later or to whatever because there are other points, right? I suggest we do that. Something. I think we have discussed this for the past 20 minutes.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thank you, Eduardo. Any other points? We might have exhausted this one. Alan, you wanted to respond? There's someone behind. We'll have to have a microphone. Okay. Please introduce yourself.

BARRACK OTIENO: Thank you. Barrack Otieno from AFRALO. I've been following the discussion as a member, and the only comment I want to make is it's better to get it right than to move fast. And I think I want to beg the Chair to just, given the facts that have been brought up, to help us make the right judgment. Because the mood I am seeing on the list is that we want to rush and get something done, but we need to do it right. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Barrack. I think we've decided to put square brackets in this one, which will give us the time to come back to it afterwards. Alan Greenberg?

ALAN GREENBERG: Yeah. Thank you. On the second-to-last one, I have a clarification. The IFRT recommendation only goes to the GNSO, ccNSO if there is a recommendation to separate. So a recommendation not to separate does not go to them for reversal. It only is a throttle to stop separation if the GNSO, ccNSO does not like it. So I think we're okay with dropping that one.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Alan. That's a valid point. Okay. So we got square brackets for that line. Let's scroll up, please. Oh. And that looks like all of it. Tijani Ben Jemaa.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Thank you, Olivier. Alan, what you just said is another reason not to drop it. Because if we go to GNSO, ccNSO only if there is a decision of separation, that means that it might be changed by the GNSO, ccNSO, isn't it? So the final decider, in this case, will be the GNSO, ccNSO, not the [IRFT].

ALAN GREENBERG: The only decision they can make is not to do separation, which supports our original position that we should never have separation.

So I have no problem with an extra step, which might get where we wanted to be to begin with.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Alan. I have a note from Grace Abuhamad, who, of course, knows the proposal inside out. I don't know if she is in the...

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: She's right behind you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Right behind me. I did think she was quite close to me. Maybe we should read this or, Grace, do you want to explain the point exactly?

ALAN GREENBERG: I think I did summarize it because I got the same note from Grace.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. But I understood your summary differently than what I was reading here. So that's why.

ALAN GREENBERG: Let's hear from Grace.

GRACE ABUHAMAD: Hi, everyone. I'm a staff member on the CWG. I just wanted to clarify what the text says. I know it's a complicated text. If you look at page

25 of the proposal, the first point of clarification is that the IFRT reports to the ICANN Board. So all recommendations go to the ICANN Board. Decisions are made at the ICANN Board level.

The second point of clarification is that, as Alan said earlier, only in the case of a recommendation by the IFRT for separation does that decision go, then, to the GNSO and ccNSO councils for a second vote, essentially, before it goes to the ICANN Board. In which case, it's a sort of a security mechanism for the GNSO and the ccNSO to make that decision to reverse or not before it goes to the Board. And then the Board still has a final say.

So I think that that should help with Tijani's point.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much for this, Grace. And just to make sure, that therefore means that if the IFRT was to say there should be no separation, then there is no vote that could overturn that and produce a separation. Okay. Are we clear? Good.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay. Thank you. I have my marching orders. I'll draft something and send it out as soon as I can. I've already made on promise to the GAC that I'll do something before I go to sleep tonight. I'm not making that promise to you, but it will be done well before Thursday morning.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Alan. Heidi has sent me her notes on what we've decided here. So can you please work with her and make sure that, then, you've got an actual record of what's been happening? Okay. Any further comments or questions on this? I think we've gone through those points.

The next thing that we need to do is to have a look at, perhaps, the text for the ratification of this. Because, of course, the report has to be ratified by the SOs and ACs before it gets transmitted along to the next stage of the process. So we need to draft a motion.

ALAN GREENBERG: That's what I said I'd do.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: I thought you were going to draft just those points.

ALAN GREENBERG: I will draft these points and I can do three whereases and a therefore. Unless you really want to invoke someone else that we then have to work with.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Nobody wants to work with you, Alan.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: In which case, thank you, Alan. In which case, I would also recommend, then, that you have look at a GNSO's motion and to have a look at the GAC motion.

ALAN GREENBERG: I thought we were going to do that next here, but I, of course, will look at them.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Since you will be holding the pen on this, I think it would just be a waste of time for us to look at what others are doing at the moment, especially in light that the GAC communique has not been voted on yet and the GNSO hasn't voted on the motion, either. So there might be some changes, friendly amendments, etc. And I should slow down speaking because I can feel heat from the interpreter's booth.

Right. CWG Accountability. I think we've closed the discussion on the CWG IANA. Any other last comments, questions, or points from anybody in the room? Not only if you're sitting at a table. Oh, Sebastien Bachollet?

SEBASTIEN BACHOLLET: Yeah, just one point. I appreciate the work done by AFRALO. I would hope that all the RALOs will have done the same job. It would have been a very good improvement of our work. Then I would like, even if the discussion was tough, that we all agree that AFRALO did a very good job. Thank you very much, AFRALO.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Absolutely. If I could add...

ALAN GREENBERG: I'm going to speak, even if you don't let me speak.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Overruled.

ALAN GREENBERG: I didn't think we needed to say that because I know I and the ALAC have already said that in at least one or two times, that the fact that a RALO has taken the trouble to do this and, not only made a statement, but made a statement publicly, is a model for all of the RALOs to follow. So Sebastien, yes, you are exactly right. Some of us already said it several times, and I hope that arguing against inclusion of a point in the final document does not alter that or alter the perception of that.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Alan. And that said, I think we should also recognize that there are some ALSes that have conducted some sessions, locally, for their local population and local community. I can see one person here. And there are others. I've heard of several countries, several ALSes that have conducted that in their country with the input, as a result, of their local population. Tijani Ben Jemaa?

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Thank you, Olivier. Just to follow on what you said, it is an effort from the Vice President for Africa, Pierre Dandjinou, who decided that Africa should speak about that. He called that national consultation about transition and accountability. And he made several sessions in several countries, among them, Tunisia and Morocco, where I participated in both. Thank you very much.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Tijani. And that certainly shows that proactivity brings the input in, and maybe that's some lesson to be learned for the other regions in future such consultations.

We can now move to the CCWG Accountability. And we are going to review, well, originally the agenda was saying we will review the public comments and go through the second public comment period planning.

Of course, the second public comment period is likely to be in August and, as you know, the CCWG has met before this meeting. And so a lot of things have happened since the last time we spoke in our working group call. I wonder if we could have a summary of where we are today. We have Leon Sanchez, who is with us. So perhaps Leon can provide us with a summary.

I know that Sebastien Bachollet has also got all of the latest developments, but I guess Leon would probably also be aware. So shall we start with Leon Sanchez?

LEON SANCHEZ:

Thank you very much, Olivier. I'm happy to provide an update on the latest developments with the CCWG. We received a lot of comments during the public comment period. We went through them, we came back to the different working parties and our rapporteurs in order to go through the different comments, analyze them, classify them, etc. And, of course, we're in the process of providing answers to those comments.

We will be holding different meetings during the week. We will be starting tomorrow. We will be having very intensive sessions. And our goal is, of course, not only to provide answers to the public comment and do the proper document answering those comments, but also to continue discussing the different options that we have on the table.

The latest development was that in our Friday meeting, our face-to-face meeting on Friday, we literally took off the table, that is, for the avoidance of doubt, not considering any more the membership model. Okay? So what we came up to is...

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND:

Leon, let me just jump in. Not considering the membership model under any circumstances, so no membership model with legal enforcement, no membership model without legal enforcement? It's just no membership at all. Is that correct?

LEON SANCHEZ:

We are continue to discussing which way we're going to go definitively. But the reference model, which used to be a membership

model, is not anymore a reference model. It's just another model. Okay?

So what we came up to is with a hybrid model, and I don't know if Becky is here, but if she listened to me saying this, it's the Becky proposal. She'd hate me for that because she says that it's not Becky's proposal. This is the CCWG proposal, of course, the empowered SO/AC proposal.

As I said, this is a hybrid proposal in which we would be doing a couple of bylaws changes, of course, but this would leave the legal nature of the SOs and ACs as it is. We wouldn't be touching anything on the SOs and ACs as they are today. Nevertheless, the SOs and ACs could exercise proposed community powers: this is removing the Board, removing the individual members, locking and reviewing the budget, the independent review panel.

All these powers for the community would be able to be exercised as soon as we adopted the new bylaws that we would be drafting without any requirement for any SO or AC to formalize its status as a member. Because, as I said, we wouldn't be talking about a membership model anymore as opposed to this hybrid model. We would, however, leave the door open for any time at a future point for any SO or AC that would consider it proper to actually become a member in order to exercise those powers or enforce those powers to be able to do that.

So this would be a very flexible, very lightweight model, in which we wouldn't be really doing a lot of craftsmanship into the bylaws. But we

would, as I said, leave the door open for when time comes, and if time comes, each SO/AC would be able to actually gain this legal personhood in order to have the authority to exercise these powers once they have exhausted all internal measures.

This would, of course, provide a path of scalability. We are looking at this model as a last resort, always a last resort. If a membership is needed, this, of course, last resort in the chain of events that will lead to this. And so far, legally, the best way to achieve this is still a membership model. But this is also available under designator model, but we need to be aware that, under the designator model, we would be losing two powers, which would be the review and the blocking of the budget, and that would take us into a path that wouldn't be aligned with what the CWG has set as conditions or dependencies between the CWG and the CCWG.

So far, of course, as I said, the door could be left open for membership model to come in, and I want to be very clear about this. This is not the definitive new proposal. This is just another proposal. We need to discuss this. We need to flesh out the different details with regards to how we plan to build this escalation path into the different internal remedies that we could begin to use as soon as we update the bylaws.

This is also very important, whether or not an SO or an AC decides to formalize its legal personhood, the bylaws would be drafted in a way that would ensure that the relative number or the power and influence of any SO or AC would remain the same. So we have also been looking very carefully and very thoroughly to the community council so we

bring balance to the Force, as the Jedis would say, and so we don't disbalance this equation.

So I guess it would be proper for me to, if Olivier, if you agree, we could, of course, take questions and comments from the table.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Absolutely, Leon. Please, let's proceed forward. You want me to run the queue? Okay, so I'll run the queue, and you can, I guess, you'll have power to reply to every single question. And, of course, the floor will be open for everyone. I hope we have a good discussion here. So the floor is open, and I see a standing bottle from Alan Greenberg. Alan, you have the floor.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you. I don't seem to have a card, so the Coke bottle will have to do. I guess a couple of things. On the designator versus membership, we did make a statement, originally, that between the two, we prefer membership because it's easier to explain. We neglected to consider the fact that that means, essentially, changing ICANN into a membership organization with new articles of incorporation.

And that, I think, philosophically changes ICANN significantly, and certainly, I made a statement within the ALAC a day or so ago that if I were to reconsider it today, I would probably change my decision and that was supported by a number of ALAC members.

So my preference between the two is a designator model and not to change to a membership organization. The lack of vetoing a strategic plan, I see, does not alter things whatsoever. A strategic plan by its very nature is a long-term thing, and if we have the ability to discharge the Board, so to speak, we can change strategic plans. I just don't see that as a no-show.

The problem that the CWG did ask for budget veto on IANA, which maybe we can affect in a different way than an overall budget veto, I feel a little bit uncomfortable saying the community can veto a budget but the Board takes the responsibility for the repercussions of that. The community does not really have any stake in the game in terms of the short term.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: By law, the Board has fiduciary responsibility.

ALAN GREENBERG: Well, in a membership model, they can get that. That does go to the members. So I feel very comfortable without those two rights. I feel comfortable, as I indicated to the CCWG and to the ALAC, that I felt comfortable with the only right that we have enforceable being the ability to remove Board members. I think that that is a strong incentive for the Board members to talk and, ultimately, to change to remove them from their position if, indeed, we can't get our way with them.

I find a problem with the optics of this whole thing if we end up with just the GNSO and the ALAC, for instance. Because I think a membership organization needs two members, if I remember correctly, under California law. But let's say the ALAC goes along with it and we and the GNSO become the only members, I think the optics to the rest of the world of the GNSO and the ALAC controlling ICANN are really bad.

I understand this concept of the Community Council that the GNSO could only act with the approval of the Community Council. I don't think we can build rules that say that. Once you are a member, you can take action because you have legal status. That's the whole issue. So I don't think the rest of the community could veto a member from taking action as a member. That's the right as a member. So I'm not sure we could put that rule in place. If we could, it makes it a little bit more palatable, but I'm not 100% we can actually write that rule. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks very much, Alan. In the queue, we have... Oh, you wish to respond? Okay. Leon Sanchez?

LEON SANCHEZ: Thank you very much, Olivier. I want to be very clear in one thing. We are not changing anything. We are leaving the status quo as it is. We're only leaving the door open for either membership or designator model to happen, if need be, deemed necessary. Right?

As you said, if we are talking about enforcing or exercising powers, I think, and this is something that needs to be further discussed during the week, as I said. This is just a work in progress. We would need to check with legal counsel whether this is possible, and whether we can actually have the Community Council as we have designed it, have the SOs and ACs vote on the different matters that would be needed to vote in that Community Council, and only if needed, then the member with the legal standing to do so could then exercise the powers.

But let's not miss the point that ICANN's life, as it is, would remain the same and could only be transformed if needed and when needed.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you for this, Leon. So we have Seun Ojedeji first.

SEUN OJEDEJI: Thank you very much, Leon, for the summary. I have just a few comments. My first question to the CCWG and perhaps members of CWG and At-Large can also respond to that so that Leon doesn't feel like he's on the hot seat right now. I'd like to know, has the CCWG actually thought of privatizing the powers in order of preference? They were put on the list. There are six powers that have been listed.

Have we actually thought of, okay, this one is important, this one is most, and this one is a maybe kind of thing? If you have, can I have an idea of what it is?

My second comment is in relation to, yeah, so escalation process is good. These are the Internet processes relating to the empowered SO/AC model. But when it gets to the point of exercising all, I mean, applying a veto in code, what powers is required at that time? What statutes, better put, of the SOs and ACs is required at that point in time to exercise those powers?

Because I like it when you're saying "nothing is going to change, nothing is going to change," but I need to understand that "nothing is going to change" are true. So is that what "nothing is going to change" means? Or is it that when it's time to exercise the veto, something is going to change in terms of the statutes of SOs and ACs?

And my third question is, why do we have to leave membership option open? Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Seun. Leon Sanchez?

LEON SANCHEZ: Thank you very much, Olivier. So you asked two questions, Seun. The first one being a prioritization of powers, if I understood well. And so far, the group considers, and that is my feeling, that is my personal opinion, not a consensus nor a conclusion from the group, that the six powers that we have come out to are equally important, but we could, as well, prioritizing, say, as Alan suggested, maybe the most important of them all could be spilling the Board, because that would be

deterrent enough for the Board to follow the advice and follow the community's requests.

But that is not something that the group has come to prioritizing the different powers that we would try to provide the community with, so I don't have a clear answer for that.

And with regards to nothing is going to happen, as I said, the actual legal personhood of the SOs and ACs would remain untouched. And only if it was necessary to exercise a certain power, then any SO or AC, by passing a simple resolution saying we come together to exercise this extra wide power, would then gain legal personhood in order to exercise the power.

But in my mind, this model has the virtue of, while leaving the door opening, creating a deterrent enough for the Board to be aware that it can come to the point where the SOs or ACs gain the legal personhood in order to enforce the powers. So that would refrain the Board or staff or whoever plays in the field to comply and to follow the advice of the community and the different organizations.

So it's like walking with a stick and telling them that you will use it, but in fact, you will just be carrying your stick around. Yeah.

SEUN OJEDEJI:

Just a quick follow-up. So if I get it right, this is just going to be a trigger event when required. Right?

LEON SANCHEZ: Exactly.

SEUN OJEDEJI: Thank you very much.

LEON SANCHEZ: It would only trigger this situation.

SEUN OJEDEJI: Okay.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks very much for this, Leon. Next, we have Tijani Ben Jemaa.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Thank you, Olivier. I understand very well the issue of Alan, and I hear him very well. Yes, you let the door open and if it happens, we will have only GNSO and perhaps ALAC having this legal entity and using those powers. And at the end, since the ALAC doesn't have the funds and the resources to sue or to exert legal actions, it will be only the GNSO who will do that. And this will be, in my point of view, a very bad image.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Tijani. Leon Sanchez?

LEON SANCHEZ:

Thank you very much, Olivier. As I said, let's take a step back. We would be going through the community mechanism in which, as things stand, each SO or AC would have the votes that we have designed. And there is where the decision would be taken. So that is why relative weight, votes, influence, etc. would remain untouched.

And only, let's say, as you said, if the GNSO decides to gain this legal personhood. If needed, of course, because we would be relying on the internal process and try to avoid, as much as possible, going through that path. But we would leave, as I said, the door open. So if the time came in which, let's say, not the GNSO, let's say the ALAC decides to gain this legal personhood, then the Board would be catalyzed through the Community Council, and the decisions that would be reached there would be the one that would be exercised.

So it would be a community decision, and only the vehicle for exercising the power would be any given SO or AC that would gain this legal personhood.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND:

Thank you, Leon. I have a queue at the moment. Eduardo Diaz, Alan Greenberg, Sebastien Bachollet, and Cheryl Langdon-Orr. So next is Eduardo Diaz with apologies for the time it's taken to come to you, but these are important discussions. Eduardo?

EDUARDO DIAZ:

Not a problem. I just wanted to point out that yesterday, I asked informally, when do you need to become a membership? And I guess

this is a trigger event, I guess, that's what I'm hearing. But then other question I have, can I [inaudible] a membership once the whole ends up, and the answer was more or less, "No; it's a one-way street." So could be that...

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: The question was, well the second question was, can you get out of the membership model once you've gone into a membership model? And the answer was no, it's a one-way street. Is that correct, Eduardo?

ALAN GREENBERG: It's not the model. Can the AC/SO be a member or not?

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: AC/SO be a member or not?

LEON SANCHEZ: Okay. That I don't have an answer for. We would definitely need to go back to our legal counsel to double check if this is in fact a one-way street or two-way street in which, let's say, you could turn on and off membership as needed. No?

Let's say we come together to exercise a power, okay, the issue has been settled. Then we dissolve membership and we go back to our previous status. I don't know if that's possible. I think that's what you're asking me here. So I really don't know if that's possible. We

would definitely need to check this with the lawyers because, right now, I can't provide you with a proper answer to that question.

EDUARDO DIAZ: To finish, the reason I asked that is because I think the whole issue here is becoming a member and staying as member. For me, on my own, that's the impression I have. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Leon, any comment?

LEON SANCHEZ: No. I mean, as I said, I don't have a clear answer for that at this moment.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: So maybe that could be written. If you can take this as an action item and write this down. I guess these are questions from this working group.

LEON SANCHEZ: We will definitely. And I can tell you. I've already asked the lawyers that question.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you. Next is Alan Greenberg.

ALAN GREENBERG:

Thank you very much. Three points and I'll be brief. On the question of can Community Council stop a member from exercising their rights, I did ask that questions many, many weeks ago. I understand our legal counsel has, in a few cases, changed their mind on what answers are. But the answer at that point is once you have legal rights, no one can stop you from exercising them. So I'd be interested in hearing if, indeed, that's different.

LEON SANCHEZ:

Let's take a look at this step-by-step. If you become a member, there are some rights that are related to the CCWG proposal that you will be able to exercise. There are other statutory rights that are, let's say, unrelated to the debate but, nonetheless, important to the overall situation.

So counsel has provided us with a table on statutory powers that could not be waived or relinquished or otherwise taken away from members and, also, with some powers that would be feasible of just being not exercised by the members. So this is why Ed's question is, of course, important here because if, as you say, once you become a member, there is no one that can stop you, then that, of course, could raise different concerns and questions.

So that is why we need to double check on Ed's question. As I said, I have already forwarded this discussion to lawyers. They have replied to me, asking me to flesh out more details. They need, of course, more information, they need to consider different aspects, different situations in order to provide adequate legal advice on this. So it is

definitely not one question that we are going to be able to have an answer maybe in the next half hour. But hopefully, by the end of the week, or maybe in a couple of days.

ALAN GREENBERG:

Okay. Just to be clear, I wasn't asking, "Can you stop being a member?" What I was saying was, and sorry for not using the right term, the lack of legal education occasionally shows up, that I was saying that I believe this is a statutory right of being a member to be able to sue the organization. And I'm not sure the Community Council could take that right away from you. That was point number one.

Point number two, in terms of prioritization, the question asked some of us, CCWG has not prioritized, but some of us have prioritized. We have clearly said the Board removal is number one. The other three rights that a designator has are next, and then the two rights, which we have said at one point, or at least I have said at one point, that I'm willing to give up are the two at the bottom of the list. So we certainly have divided them into three, I have divided them into three groups. I won't speak on the rest of the people.

Lastly, I believe if an AC or SO, by making a motion, can become a member, then a priority before that happens, we must have transformed ICANN into a membership organization. Potentially a membership organization with no members, and I'm not sure if that's even a construct that makes any sense. But we would have had to change the articles of incorporation to be a membership organization, even if no one exercises those powers.

So there is a substantive change that we've made before anyone could even attempt to make that motion, and that one is not irreversible, but it's only reversible by changing back to a non-membership organization.

LEON SANCHEZ:

And you are right, Alan. We would need to reincorporate ICANN as a membership organization, of course. But, as I said, that is only preparing the field for membership to become true. It's not a final step. Right? So you are right. We would be, in fact, that's what I meant by modifying bylaws. We would need to change bylaws, we would need to reincorporate into membership organization, and then leave the door open for members to stand up and exercise powers if needed.

ALAN GREENBERG:

Presuming a construct of a membership organization with no members is a legal construct, which I don't have a clue. I thought it had to have two members in California, but I may be wrong.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND:

Thank you very much, gentlemen. Just a housekeeping note, we do have some network problems at the moment and our tech staff are trying to fix things. So for any remote participants, I don't think they might hear us except if they're listening through the phone. But we'll try and fix this.

We have someone trying to make a... One is enough. Okay. There was a comment from the audience.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [inaudible] to the audience.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: But that is not the audience, that's Sidley.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: That's right. [Inaudible].

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: I just recognized them. Oh, dear. Okay. Great. Alan's walked over to meet the people from Sidley. Let's move...

LEON SANCHEZ: Olivier?

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. So we have no idea on how long the network trouble will last. I suggest we continue and try and move forward with things. I don't know how much more time we need. Leon?

LEON SANCHEZ: No. I just wanted to acknowledge the attendance of our lawyers, and I would like to give a big applause to them because they have been

wonderful providing advice to the group. They have been very hardworking. So, please, join me in giving a round of applause to our lawyers.

ALAN GREENBERG: I would like to ask how often lawyers get applauded.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Right. Thank you and let me take control back of this meeting again after this interlude, and let's go down the queue, which has Sebastien Bachollet and Cheryl Langdon-Orr. So Sebastien, you have the floor.

SEBASTIEN BACHOLLET: Thank you very much, I will speak in French, if I may. Okay. First of all, I would like to say that I believe that the proposal coming from our meeting on Friday is a big progress in our analysis after listening to the comments from ALAC

Second point, since we talked in our weekly meetings, I personally made some comments on all of those topics before Friday and about the topics due to the responsibility of ICANN. I hope it's not a fait accompli. What we talked about three weeks ago, we do not go back to examining it and evolving on the topic and going forward and going farther. It's very important to have a discussion and a debate today, and I would like to hear more people not coming from those committees, and listen to them.

This is the first time I hear that ICANN should be registered in California, in the state of California. If it is the case, reincorporation in the state of California, it seems to me that the model with members is not a good model if we have to do so. I think we have to make sure ICANN evolves and make sure that the bylaws are improved. And if we need to reregister the organization in the state of California, I think we have some considerable risks to do so. And I do not agree with that.

I would also would like to talk about the powers of the community, and I would like to remind you that the Board is elected by the community, directly or not. I agree that, at one point, would you not trust the Board anymore? But I think it's the community and every three years the Board members are going to change. And when you didn't like a Board member would be able to change that Board member and not reelect that person, why do you have to recall the entire Board? Is my question.

With nine members, the Board can keep on working for ICANN, and that would enable ICANN to keep going. If we recall the entire Board member or we never do it and there's no use to it, it's not a good option. It's the nuclear option, as you call it sometimes. I am against the war, so I am against nukes and nuclear options. It's not a good option.

We have to find a way to work together. So to recall Board members, yes, but the entire community has to be able to recall a Board member, but I remind you that five new Board members come every year. So out of one year, you can change 12 Board members, that's

more than enough, and it's going to be much better for ICANN and for the organization.

Regarding the change of bylaws, no problem with that. I think we need a separation of SO and AC being organized. I think the bylaws are very important.

And regarding rejecting the budget, I do believe that we need to be able to intervene earlier because if we throw out the budget, it's going to take more than six months discussing it and for many months, we won't have any budget. The ICANN would be without budget. It's an issue. I think we have to find a way to approve that budget, to have a budget approved by the Board, which takes into account everybody's opinion.

That's what I wanted to say. I think our debate is extremely important today. We're going to work some more tomorrow in our working group. We are going to move forward. We're going to find the best possible solution in order to avoid changing too many things at once and being able to have a multi-stakeholder organization with everybody on an equal footing.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: I guess you've kept all of your comments to one long intervention, but it's quite a full intervention, I think, with a lot of points that were made. So thank you for this. Now we have Cheryl Langdon-Orr, and then Seun Ojedeji. So Cheryl, you have the floor.

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I put my hand up so long ago that a number of the points have actually been made, but one I just want to make sure everyone is clear about, and that is this matter of becoming a member, in whatever way you want to define that, which can be, and I think, I'm comforted by the option of it being able to be activated at a future point in time. I very much like this empowered AC/SO model because I think we should be able to.

I don't think I've got this wrong, but as far as I know, we should be able to exercise all the same rights. We just couldn't enforce those rights. Now, there really is no downside for me on that. So unless I've really got that wrong, going with this particular model, I know that does mean that there will be the preparation required in terms of rejigging the design, the classification.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Do you need some water, perhaps?

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: I have water.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: You have water. Well, you might need to drink water rather than having... You need vodka? Okay. Can we, perhaps, ask our Ukrainian remote participants to please send vodka from the Ukrainian hub?

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Send vodka. See? It'd be much better if it was vodka. Anyway. Really good Ukrainian vodka would get on very well right now. But I think we should go through the relatively small and simple modification to the classification of the type of not-for-profit that we are, and allow for this as an option. Right? This is my hand-on-heart speech.

I really don't mind that, should we get to this nth degree stage where everything's gone so ghastly wrong that we're going to want to be enforcing these things, that a small number than all of the ACs and SOs may have chosen to become legal persons and enforce those rights. Because I only need one of them to enforce the rights, providing I and the rest of the community agree with that pathway.

And as I understood it, particularly with pertaining to the budget, things like to protect the ongoing operation of IANA in our budget design team, we have specifically put into place for expectation that amounts will be held in escrow, etc. so ICANN doesn't stop functioning.

Also, with the spilling of the Board, the concept of spilling a whole board, just the PR value, for heaven's sake, we'd have all packed up our bat and ball and gone home by the time we got to that mess. And so I really couldn't give a damn about that by the time we get to that. But people want it, and I'd be happy to go along with it.

What I do care about is the right to recall from the appointing bodies, including the nominating committee. I don't believe that only that appointing body should have the right to do it. I believe it needs to be a higher bar than that, but I think piss-poor performance should be

dealt with at the earliest possible time, given one or two goes of remediation, have a chat, and if not, out of here. It's a solution and it's one I support.

So I would like to, because I'm not going to eat with you tomorrow. I'm trying to help people decide on significant numbers of leadership for the next three years. I'd like you to remember my impassioned speech here because if we don't do this, we won't get consensus, and we will not take the next step, and that has very broad-ranging ramifications. Think smart; this is not poker. We've had our game faces on up until now. Let's get serious about finding a consensus solution that most of us get as much as we can in terms of comfort out of it.

This massive planning gone in for this ultra, ultra, ultra-small likelihood of needing to enforce these exercised rights and privileges, it beggars belief the amount of time we've put into it, just the amount of human hours and dollar hours. So let's get real, let's get this done. If you can't, that's okay, too. But do remember we're not just here in our – and nobody's going to live or die over this. Right? We're actually not making that big a difference. IANA can stay where it is and there you go. Tough. No problem. No skin off a bunch of people's noses. But we're not getting another chance.

So if you want to transition, and part of the CWG requirements for that is things like budget veto, etc., you're going to have to go down the pathway that means ACs like us who do not want, and I do not support that model, don't have to join up unless they want to, and someone, should needs be, can exercise the powers. Thank you, and I think I

managed to clear whatever elephant was in my left lung while I was saying that.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Cheryl. So now we've had two long interventions, but I felt it was important to get those through. Could I please ask people afterwards if we continue with long interventions, we'll be there until tomorrow morning? But it's good points that you've both made. Leon, any points that you've heard that require clarification in your view?

LEON SANCHEZ: Thank you very much, Olivier. No. I think that Cheryl gave a wonderful explanation. Sebastien shared some valid concerns, of course. But I definitely agree with Cheryl that we need to come to a consensus into this. We need to get real. I mean, the probabilities of actually having to enforce the rights. I mean, just look at the story of ICANN. It has never come to it.

So it is so remote that I think it is safe for us to give the next step and have this evolution being solid and just close the circle.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thank you, Leon. We have Seun Ojedeji.

SEUN OJEDEJI:

Thank you very much. Thank you, Cheryl, for that summary. I think I agree with most of what Cheryl said. I hope that what it also means – and I hope Leon is actually listening to that and taking notes – I hope that it will actually mean that there would be a significant review on the empowered SO/AC model that is being proposed right now.

A lot of things have been said on the mailing list in the last 24 hours. And one of the realities is that, at the moment, a lot of things are exercised by these SOs and ACs right now. And you don't need to be members to do that. We need to allow for these dynamics and flexibility in this community. That is the strength of this community.

My question to you is, is CCWG considering dropping some of these complications as soon as possible to actually focus on a solution that does not actually now include membership? Have you thought about it?

LEON SANCHEZ:

Well, I think we dropped a lot of complexity and a lot of complications on Friday, actually, coming to this hybrid model proposal. So we, of course, need to continue discussions throughout the week. Our aim would be to at least clear the path towards which we will be building our next proposal.

Remember that some of the activities that we will be undertaking this week is to reply to the comments received on the public comment period. We will also be incorporating the many comments that we received. We will be reshaping our proposal and we also have face-to-

face meeting in Paris coming at the mid-July. And there, we will focus on exactly what you just said. Taking out all the baggage that is just keeping us from going forward and having a proposal as lightweight as possible and as complete as possible for, as Cheryl put it, to be as happy or as unhappy, but even. Evenly happy or unhappy, right?

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks very much for this, Leon. Did you have any follow-up, Seun?

SEUN OJEDEJI: Actually, the follow-up question to you, actually, is does the CWG believe that ICANN Board is required? I'm saying this, apologies for repeating this because actually I've asked it on the list and I thought, perhaps, I should say it here. Does the CWG believe that ICANN Board is required to follow its bylaw with the current structure? CCWG, oh, sorry. I'm used to CWG. I can't say. CCWG.

Do you agree that ICANN, I mean, maybe not CCWG now, you. What's your opinion? Do you think ICANN Board is legally bound to obey and follow its bylaw?

LEON SANCHEZ: If my U.S. law basic knowledge doesn't fail, I would say that they are obliged to follow their bylaws and they have a fiduciary obligation to abide to the bylaws. So yes, I do believe that that they need to follow the bylaws.

SEUN OJEDEJI: Thank you very much.

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Can you enforce it, Leon?

LEON SANCHEZ: That’s another question.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: The question was, “Can you enforce it, Leon?”

LEON SANCHEZ: You have to ask the right questions to get the right answers.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: So the question was, “Can you enforce the fiduciary duty that they have?”

LEON SANCHEZ: Can you enforce or oblige the Board to steer the organization in a certain way? The way things stand today, we are not able to do that, and that’s the whole point.

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: It’s an obligation. It could be declared even as a requirement that, should push come to shove, and you have, heavens forbid, a totally rogue Board where a whole community was against it, the way we are

structured right now, we could not, as I gather, and I'm only taking the advice of others. Unless I've really been asleep at the wheel, not enforce.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Cheryl. Let's go to Alan Greenberg next in the queue.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you. On that last point, my understanding, and lawyers, of course, can tell me I'm wrong, is that in the current model, unless one could demonstrate standing, it is only the California Attorney General that could take action, if we could convince the California Attorney General to step in. No? Not so. Sure. Come on.

HOLLY GREGORY: Hi, everybody. Holly Gregory [du] Sidley [interpreter speaking in French].

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Well, everyone is getting very tired so the French are now speaking English and the English are speaking French. Now we have nothing [inaudible]...

Is it testing? Is this working? It's working now. Okay. So next is Sebastien Bachollet.

SEBASTIEN BACHOLLET: No. I'm sorry. I will do that because I need to be sure to be understood by the legal person, who are behind you, that's why. If I understood well what you just said, you say that a Board member can enforce decisions. That means that if I will take the, "if you have the right question, you may get the right answer," and my feeling is that since the beginning, we are not asking the right question. Then I will try to ask you the right question.

Can we have Board member who are representing the bodies they're coming from? Today, when we get into the Board, the legal of ICANN tell us or tell the Board member that now you need to act only, you are not representing your community, you are acting only for the good of the corporation.

It is, today, the case. If we have members who are representing their community into the Board, and if they can enforce the decision, can this be the solution we are looking for? Because we can recall this Board member, then we can change it, and he can act as the one who enforce the corporation because he's a member of the Board. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Sebastien. Who from the legal team is ready to step up? Does anyone have the mic? Here we go.

ROSEMARY FEI: Rosemary Fei, outside counsel to CCWG from Adler & Colvin. When a director serves on the board of a California nonprofit public benefit

corporation like ICANN that has been put there by a body with some sense that they are brought to bring their views, they're put on that board to bring the views of that constituency to the Board.

So you don't leave that at the door. It comes in with you and it influences how you see the best interests of ICANN. ICANN does have interests, but all the Board members will not necessarily always agree on what is in the best interests of ICANN. That's why you can have something other than a unanimous vote.

So you could have a situation where some directors believed that the decision made was not in ICANN's best interests, and if there had been some error made in process or some error in the use of assets relative to the purposes of the corporation, that director would have standing to challenge that in court.

SEBASTIEN BACHOLLET: I would have been very happy to have this legal advice before I was member of the Board.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Sebastien. And I believe this might have been, was this, perhaps, the close that Karl Auerbach used when he was on the Board and sued ICANN when he wanted to have some information given to him? Okay.

Seun Ojedeji is next. Then I've got Alan Greenberg, and I think we're all get together very tired today, including the interpreters. So let's get Seun Ojedeji.

SEUN OJEDEJI: I just want to get clear. Alan made a very critical statement that I think I need to get clarification on. Is that he prefers an empowered SO/AC designator model. That is, of course, a member. A formalization will require formalization of SO/AC in one way or the other. Right? It's not correct?

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Alan, do you wish to...?

SEUN OJEDEJI: This [designator] model would not require any form of formalizing SOs or ACs?

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Alan Greenberg?

ALAN GREENBERG: To be a designator or a member, you have to have a legal persona. At one point, we were saying the unincorporated association was the mechanism. We are now saying that by saying you want to avail yourself of the rights described in XXX, you now have a legal persona, and that legal persona can be used as a member if it is a membership

organization or as a designator if it's a non-membership organization and the bylaws allow the concept of designators.

So in both cases, you are empowering yourself. In one case, you are empowering yourself to be a member, but the organization has to have been transformed into a membership organization before that could happen. Or it has to have provisions to have designators, in which case you're transforming yourself into a designator. And, in fact, a membership organization can also allow for designators. So if we're a membership organization, you can choose to just be a designator.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Is that a big clearer, Seun?

SEUN OJEDEJI: Okay. Maybe I shouldn't stretch this on this, actually, but my point, what I was trying to get at is the fact that some SOs or ACs may actually not want to be members or designators or whatever it is that we is proposed. So we need to face, I mean, we need to put that into consideration as you consider the SO/AC empowered model.

So putting things straight just like Alan did, I would strongly prefer that whatever needs to be written to ensure community engagement and to ensure that the Board actually engaged the community in its decision making process should be done in the bylaw. And we should just end it at that point. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks very much, Seun, and I have only Alan Greenberg left in the queue. So Alan, perhaps you might wish to reply and close off, perhaps.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay. I'll reply. Part of what Seun said, I think, is someone who doesn't opt to be empowered, by default you are unempowered until you take action to be empowered. No, no. You're unempowered to take legal action in that kind of stuff. Doesn't mean you may not be participating in a community council. I understand that. Yeah. But if we have empowered ACs, then before you empower yourself, you're unempowered. Sorry.

I think in any real situation, we are not going to have a Board going rogue with every single Board member doing it. That is so highly unlikely that I'm willing to accept the fact that there's a risk in that happening. I really am.

But if that is not going to happen or it's not a thing we need to worry about, then there's always going to be one director who's opposing what the decision of the Board is, and that director does have standing to take the Board to court, if indeed the Board is violating its bylaws.

Now, they can't take them to court because they don't agree with them, and that's fine. But if indeed the Board is violating its bylaws, and if the bylaws say, "The organizations have certain rights." Right now, we have a bylaw saying the GNSO appoints two Board members.

If the Board were to say, without changing the bylaws, but the Board, by majority vote, were to say, “We’re not accepting them to sit on the Board.” The directors who oppose that vote could take the rest of the Board to court because they are not following the bylaws.

Now, a two-thirds majority of the Board could change the bylaw real quick. But if they don’t have the wisdom of doing that, then there is standing. And if the bylaws say, in the future, that the bylaws can only be changed with agreement of the ACs and SOs, then they’re either going to violate the bylaw, in which case they can be taken to court by one of the directors, or they can’t change the bylaws unilaterally. And I see that as completely safe.

If we’re really worried that the whole Board is going rogue, they’ve all been bought by the Russians or whatever, then so be it. I want to be one of the boards who’s bought by the Russians. So that’s why I’m not particularly concerned about not having the ability of taking the Board to court. I just don’t see it as a realistic scenario. Thank you. I’ve said everything I wanted to say.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Alan. I see everyone is pretty tired around the table. There’s been a very good discussion taking place here. We have some action items for you, Alan, on the CWG IANA, and so we’ll be following up with staff directly immediately after the end of this meeting.

Any additional points from our legal counsel in the room? I believe there was a question as to whether you could attend and whether you've heard anything that's completely out of the way and doesn't make sense legally. Are we pretty much in the right direction on the legality of the discussions and the points that, our assumptions and so on?

ROSEMARY FEI:

We don't really know what the details of the model are yet that's being proposed, so it's too soon for us to weigh in at all about the legalities of it.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND:

Okay. Thank you very much. Thanks to all of you for being here so late. I realize there are a lot of things going on tonight. So I would like to thank our interpreters before we close off. This has been more than two hours. I think it's 2 hours and 15 minutes that they have not stopped. And, of course, thanks to our tech crew for having managed to fix that Internet problem and everything else.

And with this, this meeting is now adjourned. Thank you. I think that Gisela might be providing some housekeeping announcement that doesn't need to be on the recording. Thank you and goodbye.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]